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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

JEAN LEVANGER and REBECCA
LEVANGER,
Plaintiffs/Appellants,
Case No,
JOANN VINCENT, KEN FISHER, DIANE
DUPLANTY, RON DUPLANTY, JAN
NEMCIK, BECKY NELSON, ROSIE
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JANE DOES 1-5, and HIGHLAND
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ASSOCIATION, INC.,

990301-CA

Priority No. 15

Defendants/Appellees.

JURISDICTION OF THE APPELLATE COURT
The Court of Appeals has jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code
Ann. § 78-2a-3(j) (2002).

The appeal was transferred to the

Court of Appeals from the Utah Supreme Court.
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
The issues presented for review are these:
1.

Did the trial court properly determine that LeVangers

were proper representatives to pursue this derivative
shareholders' action?
2.

Did the trial court properly hold that a substantial

benefit was conferred on Highland Estates, sufficient to justify
the award of attorneys' fees to LeVangers?

3.

Did the trial court err in granting defendant Highland

Estates' motion for return of garnished funds?
Standard of Review
The standard of review on an appeal from the denial of the
motion for directed verdict on the issues of standing and
substantial benefit is the same.

The parties in whose favor the

judgment has been rendered, the LeVangers here, are entitled to
all reasonable inferences that may be drawn from the facts.
Appellants are required to marshall all the evidence and
demonstrate that all of the evidence in favor of the
determination is insufficient to support the trial court's
decision.

As the Utah Supreme Court held in Brewer v. Denver &

Rio Grande W.R.R., 31 P.3d 557, 569 (Utah 2001):
[T]his standard obligates "the appealing party '[to]
marshal the evidence in support of the verdict and then
demonstrate that the evidence is insufficient when
viewed in the light most favorable to the verdict.'"
. . . . In other words, demonstrating insufficiency of
the evidence requires an appealing party to show that
all the evidence in favor of the verdict "cannot
support the verdict."
(citations omitted).
As regards the appeal from the granting of the Association's
motion to return garnished funds, the standard of review is one
of abuse of discretion.

Lund v. Hall, 938 P.2d 285, 287 (Utah

1997).
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STATUTES AND RULES WHOSE INTERPRETATION IS OF
CENTRAL IMPORTANCE TO THE APPEAL
Rule 23.1 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure is of central
importance to the Association's appeal, and provides as follows:
In a derivative action brought by one or more
shareholders or members to enforce a right of a
corporation or of an unincorporated association, the
corporation or association having failed to enforce a
right which may properly be asserted by it, the
complaint shall be verified and shall allege (1) that
the plaintiff was a shareholder or member at the time
of the transaction of which he complains or that his
share or membership thereafter devolved on him by
operation of law, and (2) that the action is not a
collusive one to confer jurisdiction on a court of the
United States which it would not otherwise have. The
complaint shall also allege with particularity the
efforts, if any, made by the plaintiff to obtain the
action he desires from the directors or comparable
authority and, if necessary, from the shareholders or
members, and the reasons for his failure to obtain the
action or for not making the effort. The derivative
action may not be maintained if it appears that the
plaintiff does not fairly and adequately represent the
interests of the shareholders or members similarly
situated in enforcing the right of the corporation or
association. The action shall not be dismissed or
compromised without the approval of the court, and
notice of the proposed dismissal or compromise shall be
given to shareholders or members in such manner as the
court directs.
As regards the LeVangers' cross-appeal, Rule 4-504(1) & (2)
of the Utah Code of Judicial Administration and Rules 5(b)(1),
58A(d), and 64D(e) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure are of
central importance.

They provide, in relevant parts, as follows:

(1) In all rulings by a court, counsel for the
party or parties obtaining the ruling shall within
fifteen days, or within a shorter time as the court may
direct, file with the court a proposed order, judgment,
or decree in conformity with the ruling.
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(2) Copies of the proposed findings, judgments,
and orders shall be served upon opposing counsel before
being presented to the court for signature unless the
court otherwise orders. Notice of objections shall be
submitted to the court and counsel within five days
after servi ce.
Rule 4-504(1) & (2) of the Utah Code of Judicial Administration.
(b)

Service: How made and by whom,.,

(1) Whenever under these rules service is
required or permitted to be made upon a party
represented by an attorney, the service shall be made
upon the attorney unless service upon the party is
ordered by the court. Service upon the attorney or
upon a party shall be made by delivering a copy or bymailing a copy to the last known address or. if no
address

i^ Wiow T ^ - bv

"! e^vi na ] t VJ"i t-h the*

n"' f-TV: rc

t~he

court:

( JL
Notice cl -jiinii j ;r entry
_i judgment
copy cf the signed judgment: shall be promptly served by
the party preparing it in the manner provided in Rule
5. The time for filing a notice of appeal is nc/
affected fc trie requirement cf this provision

(e •

• -~*r'' - ce c f wri r ; r1-. I u. n,

(pre-judgment

or after

judgment).

genera 1 servi

ce

The writ, any order

pursuant to subdivision(s) of this rule, and any order
pursuant to Rule 64A(3), shall be served upon the
garnishee by a sheriff, constable, deputy, or such •.
other person designated by court order and return
thereof made in the same manner as a return of service
upon a summons. All other service may be by first class
mail or hand delivery,

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature cf the .!..ise
This is a -;.e.r vative action brought bv the LeVangers on
behalf of members of uhe H:"-h:..ana Estates rrcreicies Owners

4

Association similarly situated to seek rescission of the
Association's execution and recording of amended CC&R's in 1995,
approved by way of written ballot without benefit of a members
meeting, as required by law.

Not all members of the Association

were contacted regarding their right to vote on the matter, and
the proposed amended CC&R's, as presented to the members, was
revised before recording.

This Court overturned the trial

court's grant of summary judgment in favor of the Association.
The trial court has ordered the rescission of the amended CC&R's
and the LeVangers were awarded their attorneys fees following an
evidentiary hearing.

The Association has appealed.

Following an order of the trial court granting the LeVangers
their attorneys fees incurred in prosecuting the action, the
LeVangers garnished from the Association the amount of the award.
The Association obtained an order from the trial court requiring
the return of the garnished funds.

The LeVangers have appealed.

Course of Proceedings
Plaintiffs filed their verified complaint January 21, 1997.
R.9.

Defendant Homeowners Association filed its answer February

26, 1997.

R.77.

Plaintiffs filed a motion to reconsider the decision
granting summary judgment or to certify the order as final and
appealable on July 16, 1998.

R. 479.

The Court denied the

motion to reconsider and granted the motion to certify the

5

summary judgment a s final p u r s u a n t to R u l e 5 4 ( b ) in i t s O r d e r of
Marcl ] 3

Il 9 9S

2 C53

I

The LeVangers filed a Notice of Appeal on Maxch 31, 1 999,
F

-

'

-

•

A p p e a l s r y \ r-j*

:

.

-

•

,

•

•

n a t e d May r-,

.

-

unci i . Je-1 '"ay *:

19-9

1063.
The Court of A p p e a l s issued
i---"^?; : . •.

-

its. o p i n i o n April 1 3 , 2 0 0 0 ,

.

I.ding I:hal I lit

a m e n d e d C C & R ' s w e r e illegaiJy adopted by t:;e H o m e o w n e r s
A s s o c :i a t
2 000) .

C^iL-Jl'... il

—„_.t *

A pp

See A p p e n d i x E r o Appe; l a r k ' s H n e : .

Based

*-

• •

court ordered tne rescission

>r .ue amende ^

CC&K'S

• • t:i :i a ]
an:i t r-e

LeVangers were awarded their attorneys fees toiiowirv: ui
D

evidentiary hearing.

1

" ] 1556.

The Court entered its ri]n.na a w a r i m c r : •;* i \ r if f s the±r
attorney;
Based

* ' 'i*- "

p : . ^ crj

:--

November i9, ^
n

,

.

K

~"

tr

wy. ^

T

p

p ri I ,.> ^

.-1E;;'5

:,

County

p e r sona] ] y coi i t - "• • - ^

.-iuu ^ ^ .verv o n

:5S6. en N o v e m b e r . v, 2 .;, rliinti:fs
i

•-

.*•

s L

,

i

*•

•'

•

Order on December

P'air/ i f f.c r i'°v] i*-o ^

i: - :.J - :' a: . .

. -. . -^ * ,.

:

Surmr

1[;C;1

:e°? and costs ^n A>veiui3e i

•

.

R

3 555,

'

. J? '

Plai ntiffs' counsel

: i i r t " s C3 e :n : ] z DI i D e c e m b e r

11,

'»

inquire as to the Judge's availability to sign the Order.
1610-1611.

R.

The Clerk informed plaintiffs' counsel that the Order

had already been signed.

R. 1611.

A Writ of Garnishment, directed to garnishee, Bank One Utah,
N.A., was duly issued and served upon the garnishee on December
11, 2001. R. 1570-1576.

The Garnishee mailed notice to

defendant Highland Estates of the garnishment and of defendant's
rights under Rule 64.

R. 1575. The Affidavit of garnishee

indicated that the Notice was mailed to Highland Estates on
December 19, 2001. R. 1575.
Highland Estates knew of the signing of the Order by at
least December 28, 2001. R. 1597. Defendant filed a Notice of
Appeal in early January, 2002.

R. 1583-1584.

Defendant did not

file a motion to stay collection activities, nor did it file a
supersedeas bond with the Notice of Appeal.
The trial court granted the Association's subsequent motion
seeking return of the garnished funds.

R. 1621-1626.

The Association appeals and the LeVangers cross appeal.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
1.

In their verified complaint, the LeVangers alleged,

with respect to the standing issue:
1.
Plaintiffs bring this action derivatively
under Rule 23.1 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure,
on behalf of themselves and all other members of
Highland Estates Properties Owners Association, Inc.
(''Highland Estates")/ similarly situated, and in the
right and for the benefit of Highland Estates.
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2,
Plaintiffs fairly and adequately represent
the interests of the members similarly situated in
enforcing the rights of Highland Estates and seek to
enforce only claims on behalf of Highland Estates which
management .:.f Highland Estates refuses to pursue,
Plaintiffs assert no personal claims agai nst Highland
Estates bv this action.
3,
Plaintiffs have owned a membership interest
in Highland Estates at all times relevant * - " u ~
allegations in this Complaint.
4.
This is not a collusive action to confer
jurisdic. • ^ ^" -b--- ^'irt that i t otherwise would i I : t:
have.
5.
Several demands have been made by the
plaintiffs on Highland Estates and on the individual
defendants who are currently members of the Board of
Trustees of Highland Estates. Defendants have refused
to take action on the demands.

2 . 1 :

.:-;•.-..

* -•:.

:

Highland Estates admitted that several demands .-.ad been mac- by

the Board of Trustees of Highland Estates.
I

\.
3.

Highland Estates filed a motion, for summary judgment on

No^ member 2 6

2 9 97 .

In :! ts memorandum, Highland Estates argued

that plaintiffs did not have standing to pursue the action
derivative! y:
In the case at hand plaintiffs purport to represent all
members of Highland Estates. Plaintiffs aire unable to
fairly and adequately represent the interests of the
other members because: (] ) the plaintiffs!s sole
motive for bringing this action was vindication agaii ist
certain Board members; (2) plaintiffs' personal
interest substantially outweigh any derivative
interests; (3) economic antagonism exists between the
8

LeVangers and the members; and (4) plaintiffs have
virtually no support from the other members.
R. 211-212.
4.

In opposition to plaintiffs' motion for summary

judgment on the standing issue, the LeVangers obtained Affidavits
from Shelby Jean Ramsdell and Robert G. Blackbourn, Jr., members
of the Highland Estates Properties Owners Association in support
of the LeVangers.
5.

R. 355-357; 359-362.

Shelby Jean Ramsdell was a member of the Highland

Estates' Board of Trustees at the time she executed her
Affidavit.
R. 360.
6.

Ms. Ramsdell knew of other members who were delinquent

in payment of their assessments to the Association.
7.

Ms. Ramsdell had paid assessments to the Association

under protest before.
8.

R. 360.

R. 360

Ms. Ramsdell agreed with the LeVangers in their

allegations regarding the unlawful adoption of the amended CC&R's
in 1994.

In her Affidavit she stated:

11. In 1994 the Association proposed amending the
CCR's, and I voted against the amendments.
12. On or about September 19,1996, after an
annual Property Owners meeting, I voiced my protest to
Association President regarding the balloting process
and the length of time the Association took to collect
ballots to amend the CCR's from August 1994 until they
were recorded in October 1995.
R. 361.
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9.

Mr. Blackbourn had been delinquent in his payment of

assessments to the Association. R. 356.
10.

Mr. Blackbourn agreed with the LeVangers in their

allegations regarding the unlawful adoption of the amended CC&R's
in 1994.

In his Affidavit he stated:

The CCR's had a deadline of November 30, 1994. A
year later votes were still being solicited. The
Association never voted to extend the vote or take a
new vote.
R. 356.
11.

Ms. LeVanger filed an Affidavit in opposition to

Highland Estates' motion for summary judgment on the issue of the
LeVangers1 standing to pursue the action derivatively.

In it,

she stated:
14. Other homeowners agree with my husband and
me. I was recently elected as a member of
Association's Board of Trustees. Other Board members
have voiced complaints similar to mine. I am not
vindictive toward any Board member.
R. 372.
12.

The trial court granted Highland Estates' motion for

summary judgment solely on the issue of the legality of manner by
which the CC&R's were amended.

The trial court denied Highland

Estates' motion for summary judgment on all other issues,
including the issue of the LeVangers' lack of standing to pursue
the action derivatively.
1.
The defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment
is hereby granted in part and denied in part as
follows:

10

A.
All of plaintiffs' claims set forth in
plaintiffs' Complaint relating to the conduct of the
members of the Board of Trustees of Highland Estates in
the manner in which the Amendment to Declaration of
Restrictive and Protective Covenants was voted on and
approved are hereby dismissed with prejudice.
B.
Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment
as its relates to all other claims in plaintiffs'
Complaint is hereby denied.
R. 470-471.
13.

In his ruling on Highland Estate's Motion, the trial

judge, Judge Nehring, noted that: "I'm at this time denying the
motion, for lack of a better term, to disqualify the Levangers as
derivative action claimants, or plaintiffs . . . ."
14.

R. 453.

In his ruling on Highland Estate's Motion, the trial

judge also noted that:
It is true that there is nothing -- few things -- more
fundamental to corporations, entities in general, than
this process by which those entities amend their
charters or their beginning documents so to speak.
R. 447.
15.

On July 15, 1998, the LeVangers filed a Motion to

Reconsider the trial court's partial grant of summary judgment
relating to the legality of the adoption of the CC&R's.

R.

479-481.
16.

In support of their motion to reconsider, the LeVangers

obtained affidavits from Christie Bambery and Michael Ferrigno,
both members of the Highland Estates Properties Owners
Association.

R. 472-474; 475-478.
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17.

Mr. Ferrigno was the then President of Highland Estates

and a member of the Board of the Association.

R. 473.

He stated

in his Affidavit:
4.
I did not vote in 1994 when the Highland
Estates Properties Owners Association proposed to amend
the CC&R's for the subdivision because I did not
receive any notice of the vote.
5.
I did not receive any letters soliciting my
vote, did not receive copies of the proposed amendments
to the CC&R's, nor was I given a ballot with which to
cast my vote.
6.
No one personally came to my house and
solicited my vote on the amended CC&R's at any time.
R. 473.
18.

Ms. Bambery stated in her Affidavit:

10. I share the opinion of the LeVangers,
plaintiffs herein, that the Board of Trustees has
operated the Association illegally and in violation of
the Association's Articles, bylaws and CC&R's.
R. 476.
19.

At the beginning of the hearing on June 26, 2 001, the

trial court, Judge Hilder, and counsel for the Association had
the following exchange:
THE COURT:
Obviously, this case has been
around a while. I read the Court of Appeals decision
and I -- I assume they're not -- there's not a lot to
be said about the underlying summary judgment, as far
as the election and the validity of the amended CC&Rs.
That's really not what your objection is, Mr. Belnap.
It's the fees, it's the issues, of course, about
probably the benefit and about the reasonableness; is
that correct? On the evidentiary basis.
MR. BELNAP:
It is, Your Honor. As you know,
from having the file, we were nine days away from trial
of this case, and we filed a motion for summary
judgment. Judge Nehring heard that and granted it
12

partially, and that's what the Court of Appeals dealt
with. There are just some very broad sweeping
allegations in the Complaint about breach of fiduciary
duty, and that's the cause of action. And he said,
"Well, what I'm going to do is -- is -- in talking to
counsel, he said, "What's this case really about?" And
counsel said, "Well, it's really about the voting -THE COURT:

Uh-huh.

MR. BELNAP:
-- and these CC&Rs." And so he
said, "Well, I'm going to grant that and then we're
going to see where that takes us," because Mr. Sheen
indicated he wanted to take an appeal. And that's
where we are today.
So I don't know if there's anything left to try on
the lawsuit itself, based on that previous discussion
at the time of summary judgment, but we certainly do
have a concern which we've raised in our papers about
benefit, success in the litigation. Also, do the
LeVangers fairly represent -THE COURT:

Oh, yeah, the derivative.

Yeah.

MR. BELNAP:
-- the derivative issue, Judge, and
then simply on the fees themselves, we don't think that
there's -- that they meet Utah law's evidentiary
requirement for the showing.
THE COURT:
You've raised a lot of issues, all
around the same essential issue of the fees, and they
seem to be very fact-intensive.
R. 1634, p. 2-4.
20.

In its ruling of November 27, 2001, the trial court

held:
The court agrees that plaintiffs must satisfy the
substantial benefit test to receive fees, but once it
is shown that the Association was required to changes
its practices, and that certain rights of the
Association members, as asserted by plaintiffs, were
vindicated, the court cannot say that a substantial
benefit was not conferred. The extent of the benefit
is potentially far-reaching, and for the court to
engage in excessive assessment of the quality of the
benefit would likely discourage similarly situated
plaintiffs from taking aggressive action for fear of
13

the financial burden if the court found that some, but
not enough, benefit was conferred in a particular case.
R. 1552.
21.

At the conclusion of the September 19th hearing, the

trial court agreed that the LeVangers had not waived the right to
present evidence on the standing issue, if necessary to preserve
their right to pursue the action:
MR. ROBINSON: And I apologize for interrupting,
but we do need to reserve the standing issue of -- if
that's -- I mean that -THE COURT:
Well, here's the thing. I don't
know if it's a big issue or not. What I'm proposing is
that you each have until a week from Friday, the 28th,
at 5:00 to file any supplemental brief you want. It
can include standing, it can include entitlement fees,
it can include the summary of the testimony on the
reasonableness and necessity in the way of a closing.
And, frankly, standing is not an issue or, if it is, it
may be factual and I'll have to consider another
hearing. I mean -- but you're not waiving it at this
time.
MR. ROBINSON:

Right.

THE COURT:
But I may determine, based on the
brief, that it's not even an issue or I may determine
we need more, and I could determine, you know, Mr.
Belnap's right, there's no standing. So I cannot tell
you. You'll have to make your best argument of what I
should do with it.
MR. ROBINSON:

I understand.

R. 1634, p.148.
22.

The Court entered its ruling awarding Plaintiffs their

attorneys' fees and costs on November 27, 2001.

14

R. 1551-1553.

23.

Based on the Court's written ruling, Plaintiffs

provided a proposed Order to defendant Highland Estates by hand
delivery on November 29, 2001.
24.

R. 1556.

On November 29, 2001, Plaintiffs mailed a copy of the

proposed order to the Clerk of the Court, Summit County.

R.

1554-1556.
25.

The Court, after the time for objection had run, signed

the Order on December 11, 2001.

R. 1555.

Plaintiffs' counsel

personally contacted the Court's Clerk on December 11, 2 001, to
inquire as to the Judge's availability to sign the Order.
1610-1611.

The Clerk informed plaintiffs' counsel that the Order

had already been signed.
26.

R.

R. 1611.

A Writ of Garnishment, directed to garnishee, Bank One

Utah, N.A., was duly issued and served upon the garnishee on
December 11, 2001.

R. 1570-1576.

The Garnishee mailed notice to

defendant Highland Estates of the garnishment and of defendant's
rights under Rule 64.
27.

R. 1575.

The Affidavit of garnishee indicated that the Notice

was mailed to Highland Estates on December 19, 2001.
28.

R. 1575.

Highland Estates knew of the signing of the Order by at

least December 28, 2001.
29.

The trial court granted the Association's subsequent

motion seeking return of the garnished funds.
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R. 1621-1626.

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The LeVangers, on behalf of all members of the Association,
contested the methods employed by the Board of the Association to
amend the CC&R's affecting the members' property.

The trustees

chose to employ a mail-in balloting process, inventing new rules
or ignoring established rules of corporate governance as it
suited their purposes in allegedly obtaining approval for the
amended CC&R's.

Their methods were fatally defective --no

record date for members entitled to vote was established; notice
of the altered method for approving the amendments was not
provided to all members; the deadline for voting was unilaterally
extended, without advance notice; property owners who became such
only after the voting process began were allowed to cast ballots;
voting tallies were improperly kept.
In its appeal, the Association has not marshalled all the
evidence from the record that supports the trial court's
determination that the LeVangers are proper representatives and
entitled to their fees.

The LeVangers have standing to pursue

this action, since the adequacy of LeVangers representation of
the other members of the Association has been previously
resolved.

The Association has the burden of establishing that

the LeVangers are inadequate representatives and it has not met
its burden.

Alternatively, the Association has waived the

standing issue since it has not objected to the award of
substantive relief to the LeVangers.
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At the very least, the LeVangers are entitled to an
evidentiary hearing on the issue of their standing as adequate
representatives since they preserved the issue with the trial
court.
The LeVangers, through their derivative action, have
conferred a substantial benefit on the Association and its
Members by this action.

Maintaining the integrity of the voting

process is a substantial benefit, as is reaffirming the in-person
meeting process, and enforcing strict compliance by the
Association and its Board with applicable statute.
The Association is not entitled to the return of garnished
funds.
ARGUMENT
I.

The Association Has Not Marshalled All the Evidence.

As this Court has noted:
[I]in order to challenge a trial court's findings of
fact on appeal, the challenger "must marshal all the
evidence in support of the findings and then
demonstrate that the evidence is insufficient to
support the findings in question." . . . We will
uphold the trial court's findings of fact if a party
fails to appropriately marshal all of the evidence. . .
Defendant has not properly marshaled the evidence
but has merely recited the findings on point and then
highlighted the evidence which he deems contrary to the
findings. Accordingly, we do not disturb the trial
court's findings and affirm the awards on appeal.
Marshall v. Marshall, 915 P.2 508, 516 (Utah Ct.App. 1996).
Here, as in Marshall, all the Association has done is recite
the evidence in the record it contends does not support the trial
court's conclusion.

The Association must deal with the evidence
17

in the record, including all reasonable inferences to be drawn
therefrom, that supports the trial court's decision, and
demonstrate how that evidence remains insufficient to justify the
trial court's decision.
Particularly, as regards the trial court's conclusion that
Judge Nehring did reach the merits of the standing issue and
effectively held that the LeVangers had standing.

The

Association does nothing to marshall all the evidence that would
support such a conclusion by the trial court.
As indicated in the LeVangers' statement of facts herein,
there is ample evidence to support the trial court's decision.
This Court need only review the facts set forth above,
particularly paragraphs 4 through 18 to understand how far short
the Association has fallen in marshalling all the evidence.
II.

The LeVangers Have Standing to Pursue This Action.

The LeVangers standing to pursue this action is limited to
the issue of the adequacy of their representation of the other
members of the Association similarly situated.

The issue has

been previously resolved or, in the alternative, the Association
has waived the issue.

In any event, and just as importantly, it

is the Association's burden to establish that the LeVangers are
inadequate representatives.
A.
The Adequacy of LeVangers Representation of the
Other Shareholders Has Been Previously Resolved.
The LeVangers have alleged and proven their right to
represent all property owners similarly situated in prosecuting
18

this action.

On at least two occasions, the Association's motion

attacks on the adequacy of plaintiffs' representation have been
rejected.
Defendant first attempted to attack the adequacy of
plaintiffs' representation in connection with its motion for
summary judgment in 1998.

Most of the written material, the

memoranda, the affidavits and the oral argument in the hearing on
January 6, 1998 dealt with the adequacy of representation.

The

Association argued the alleged inadequacy of representation on
four bases:
(1) the plaintiffsfs sole motive for bringing this
action was vindication against certain Board members;
(2) plaintiffs' personal interest substantially
outweigh any derivative interests; (3) economic
antagonism exists between the LeVangers and the
members; and (4) plaintiffs have virtually no support
from the other members.
R. 211-212.
The trial court rejected all of the Association's
contentions and the issue of standing and it lost.

Judge Nehring

determined that the Association had failed to meet its burden of
challenging the adequacy of the LeVangers' representation and
denied the Association's motion to disqualify plaintiffs as
adequate representatives.
Such a result is not surprising.

The Association offered no

evidence of the LeVangers' personal animosity toward any
particular Board member as being the determining factor in
bringing this action.

This Court, as the trial court did, need
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look no further than the fact that though individual Board
members were named as defendants for procedural purposes, no
action has been pursued against individual members of the Board.
The LeVangers personal interests are no different than any
other member of the Association - - t o correct the Association's
methods of operation and prevent the Association from trampling
on members rights to be heard and cast informed votes, and to
prevent the Association and its Board from acting contrary to the
Association's charter documents, including the CC&R's, and state
statutes.
As for economic antagonism, the record is clear that the
LeVangers were not unique in their protests over assessments.
Other members were upset with the assessment process, had paid
assessments under protest, and had been delinquent in the payment
of assessments.
No where is the Association's failure to discredit the
LeVangers more hollow than when it contends, as it continues to
do to this very day, that no other members support the LeVangers
in their pursuit of justice for members of the Association.

Many

members, including Board members and a President of the
Association, both elected by the members, signed Affidavits
supportive of the LeVangers and their attempts to require the
Association to act within the law.

Ms. LeVanger, herself, was

elected a Board member during the pendency of the present action!
The facts clearly establish that many other members are so
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supportive of the LeVangers in the present case that they will
sign Affidavits on their behalf and will elect one of the
LeVangers to serve on the Board of Trustees.
B.
Highland Estates Has the Burden of Establishing
that the LeVangers are Inadequate Representatives, and Did
Not Meet Their Burden.
The law is clear that the Association has the burden of
establishing that the LeVangers are inadequate representatives of
the members of the Association.

See, e.g., Riggin v. Rea Riggin

& Sons, Inc., 738 N.E.2d 292, 299 (Ind. Ct. App. 2000)
(M[F]ederal courts interpreting F.R.C.P. 23.1 have held that the
burden should rest with the defendant to show that the plaintiff
is not a fair and adequate representative");

Schneider v.

Austin, 94 F.R.D. 44 (1982) ("Defendants bear the burden of
demonstrating inadequate representation"). See also, Gottlieb v.
Wiles, 11 F.3d 1004, 1014 (10th Cir. 1993):
Unlike class actions under Rule 23, in shareholder
derivative suits under Rule 23.1, a preliminary
affirmative determination that the named plaintiffs
will fairly and adequately represent the interests of
the other class members is not a prerequisite to the
maintenance of the action. Rather, the rule provides
only that the derivative suit may not be maintained if
it appears that the named shareholder does not fairly
and adequately represent the other shareholders.
The Association has failed to carry its burden.

It failed

in its original motion for summary judgment before the trial
court, and it failed during the September 19th hearing.
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III. The Association Has Waived the Standing Issue.
The adequacy of plaintiffs' representation was recognized by
the parties on the prior appeal.

Plaintiffs and defendant

addressed the Utah Court of Appeals and acknowledged without
qualification to the Court of Appeals that the case before the
court was a "derivative action."
brought by plaintiffs . . . ."

("This is a derivative action
Appellant's Brief at 3.

"This is

an action brought by Jean and Rebecca LeVanger, as a derivative
action . . . ."

Appellee's Brief at 3.)

Nothing in the parties'

briefs or in oral argument asserted that the adequacy of
plaintiff's representation had not been resolved in the trial
court.
The defendant attempted again to attack the plaintiffs'
adequacy as representatives in response to plaintiffs' motion for
summary judgment before this court following the appellate
decision.

In memoranda and in oral argument, plaintiffs argued

then that the issue of adequate representation had been
previously resolved.

On June 26, 2001, this Court rejected

defendant's contention and granted plaintiffs' motion for summary
judgment.

The Court ordered that the 1995 Amended CC&R's be

rescinded and a recording to that effect be made.

The Court

could not have issued its order of June 26, 2001, if the
plaintiffs were inadequate representatives to prosecute the
action.

The Court reserved for later hearing only attorney fees,

i.e., reasonableness of plaintiffs' fees and the benefit
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conferred to the extent that issue bore on the reasonableness of
those fees.
The entire tenor of the Association's arguments before the
trial court at the June 2 6th and September 19th hearings was that
the only remaining issue before the trial court was the
LeVangers' request for fees.

Right at the beginning of the first

hearing, the Court began by outlining the remaining issues, and
counsel for the Association agreed:
THE COURT:
[T]here's not a lot to be said
about the underlying summary judgment, as far as the
election and the validity of the amended CC&Rs. That's
really not what your objection is, Mr. Belnap. It's
the fees, it's the issues, of course, about probably
the benefit and about the reasonableness; is that
correct? On the evidentiary basis.
MR. BELNAP:

It is, Your Honor.

R. 1634, p. 2.
Later on, the Association conceded that the substantive
relief requested in the LeVangers' lawsuit, should be granted by
the trial court based on the decision of the Court of Appeals in
LeVanger, 3 P.3d 187:

"So I don't know if there's anything left

to try on the lawsuit itself, based on that previous discussion
at the time of the summary judgment."

R. 1634, p. 3.

The Court also indicated the LeVangers were entitled to
substantive relief.

"What's your opinion on that, Mr. Sheen?

And I think you get your summary judgment on the underlying
issues.

I cannot imagine why you wouldn't. And I guess, in the

formal matter, what the Court of Appeals gave you."
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R. 1634, p.

4.

The Association did not object that substantive relief should

be granted and that the Association should rescind its amended
CC&R's.
At the Sept. 19th hearing, the Association reiterated that
there was nothing more to litigate in this case than the fees
requested and the form of the eventual Order on the rescission of
the amended CC&R's, based on the decision of the Court of
Appeals.
MR. BELNAP:
If there's nothing left to litigate
in the Complaint other than the fees and then the form
of orders, the separate issues that we have submitted,
or can submit orders on, Judge, which we have them here
today that we've each prepared -THE COURT:

Okay.

MR. BELNAP:
-- then I think that resolves it
and we're ready to go.
R. 1634, p. 18.
The Association raised the standing argument in the
September 19th hearing solely for the purpose of defeating the
LeVangers attempt to recover their fees in the derivative action.
"MR. BELNAP:

Under Rule 23, the plaintiffs have to establish to

this Court that they have standing.

That issue was not decided

below [sic] and remains a threshold issue for this Court to
determine with respect to whether they recover attorneys fees."
R. 1634, p. 29.
Similar attempts to resurrect t.

standing issue at late

stages of a proceeding have been rejected by the courts.

Thus,

in In Re Cendant Corporation Litigation, 264 F.3d 201, 251-52
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(3rd Cir. 2001), the court held that the defendants waived their
objections to class certification:
The Davidsons first argue that the District Court
erred by failing to make explicit findings that all of
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23's requirements were
met when certifying the Class. . . .
In their Reply
Brief, the Davidsons add the argument that Rule 23(a)'s
commonality requirement was not met as well. However,
the Davidsons neglected to raise these arguments in a
timely fashion, failing to raise them until the
settlement approval stage. We thus conclude that they
waived these arguments by not raising them earlier. See
Joel A. v. Giuliani, 218 F.3d 132, 140 (2d Cir. 2000)
(holding that objectors to a class action settlement
who argued, at the settlement approval stage, that the
Rule 23 requirements were not met for them in their
subclass were untimely with their objection, and thus
the objection was waived).
Having agreed that the LeVanger's were entitled to the
affirmative relief sought in the action, the Associaition waived
its right to subsequently contest the adequacy of the LeVangers
representation of other members of the Association similarly
situated.
IV. The LeVangers Are Entitled to an Evidentiary Hearing on
the Issue of Their Standing as Adequate Representatives.
Should this Court rule that there was insufficient evidence
to support the trial court's determination that the LeVangers
have standing to pursue this action, the LeVangers are entitled
to an evidentiary hearing to establish, once and for all, their
right to pursue this action derivatively.
The trial court noted, at the conclusion of the last hearing
in this matter, that the LeVangers would be entitled to an
evidentiary hearing if the issue came down to the sufficiency of
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the evidence supporting the adequacy of the LeVangers
representation of other members similarly situated in the
Assocaiation:

"[THE COURT:]

[S]tanding is not an issue or, if

it is, it may be factual and I'll have to consider another
hearing.

I mean -- but you're [the LeVangers] not waiving it at

this time."

R. 1634, at p. 148.

V.
A Substantial Benefit Has Been Conferred on the
Association and its Members by this Action,
The LeVangers are entitled to their attorneys' fees for
having conferred a substantial benefit on the Association and its
members.
"In a stockholder's derivative action, when the stockholder
confers a substantial benefit upon the corporation, the
stockholder bringing the derivative action is entitled to recover
a reasonable attorney fee from the corporation."

American Family

Care, Inc. v. Irwin, 571 So.2d 1053, 1062 (Ala. 1990).
Courts have had numerous opportunities to define the scope
of the "substantial benefit" that must be conferred on the
corporation to justify an award of attorneys fees.

In American

Family Care, the trial court imposed a constructive trust on 15%
of the company's outstanding shares to remedy a breach of the
duty of loyalty by a principal in the company.

The Supreme Court

of Alabama upheld an award of attorneys' fees, agreeing that a
substantial benefit had been conferred on the corporation.

In

Mills v. Electric Auto-Lite Co., 396 U.S. 375, 396 (1970), the
United States Supreme Court held that, "in vindicating the
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statutory policy [regarding proxy solicitations], petitioners
have rendered a substantial service to the corporation and its
shareholders. . . .

[R]egardless of the relief granted, private

stockholders1 actions of this sort 'involve corporate
therapeutics,1 and furnish a benefit to all shareholders . . . ."
See also, In re Vitalink Communications Corp. Shareholders
Litigation, 6 FED. SEC. L. REP. 1 96,585, at 92,746 (Del. Ch.
1991) (claims asserted in derivative action were "very weak,"
settlement "provided speculative benefits to the class,"
including ten day extension of tender offer and limitation of
allowable expenses; attorneys' fees and costs of $275,000
awarded); Martin v. F.S. Payne Co., 569 N.E.2d 808 (Mass. 1991)
(judgment gave disinterested shareholders a right to vote to
invalidate insider stock purchase; fees and costs awarded even
though stockholders subsequently approved insider purchase
terms); Scott v. Anderson Newspapers, Inc., 477 N.E.2d 553, 563
(Ind. App. 1985) (derivative action sought declaratory judgment
on proper interpretation of corporation charter; all fees and
costs awarded); Lewis v. Anderson, 692 F.2d 1267, 1270-71 (9th
Cir. 1982) (derivative action challenged validity of stock option
grants; company obtained shareholder ratification of grants after
lawsuit was filed; all fees and costs of derivative action
awarded); Neese v. Richer, 428 N.E.2d 36, 39 (Ind. App. 1981)
(shareholder in derivative action had lost on issues of
mismanagement, fraud and conversion of assets but had won on
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request for accounting; all fees and costs awarded).
Miller have noted that
reimbursement

Wright and

f!

[t]he trend appears to be to allow

[of a derivative plaintiff's attorneys fees and

costs] whenever the action furthers the objectives of the
derivative suit procedure or the policies of any applicable
substantive law."

FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE,

§ 1841, at 205 (2d

ed. 1986) (footnote omitted).
As the Court of Appeals of Indiana noted, in DRW Builders,
Inc. v. Richardson, 679 N.E.2d 902 (1997), "because the
corporation is the beneficiary of the recovery of funds or of
corrective

benefit

the

of a derivative action, the corporation bears

the expense of attorneys' fees in shareholder derivative suits."
(citation omitted; emphasis added).
A.
Maintaining the Integrity of the Voting Process is
a Substantial Benefit.
Courts have held that upholding a shareholder's right to
vote is a substantial benefit, in and of itself.

The Federal

Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, in Amalgamated Clothing
v. Wal-Mart Stores, 54 F.3d 69, 70 (1995), noted that:

"the

right to cast an informed vote, in and of itself, is a
substantial interest worthy of vindication."

In that case, the

court upheld an award of attorney's fees for the deriviative
plaintiffs, holding "that the promotion of corporate suffrage
regarding a significant policy issue confers a substantial
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benefit regardless of the percentage of votes cast for or against
the proposal at issue."

Id.

All of the judges who have considered the issue in this
action have noted how fundamentally important it is to maintain
the integrity of the voting process in a corporation,
particularly as regards amending charter documents.

The CC&R's

for a homeowners' association are at least as critical and
fundamental to its operation as are its Articles and Bylaws.
The trial court in the matter now before the Court, even
while ruling against the LeVangers on the propriety of the manner
in which the Association's CC&R's were amended, noted:

"It is

true that there is nothing -- few things -- more fundamental to
corporations, entities in general, than this process by which
those entities amend their charters or their beginning documents
so to speak."

R. 241.

This Court also noted, in its prior opinion in this action,
that:

"The statutory and by-law provisions requiring that action

by members of a nonprofit corporation be taken only at a duly
convened meeting protect the interests of the members of the
association; strict compliance with these provisions is therefore
required."

LeVanger, 3 P.3d at 191.

B.
Reaffirming the In-Person Meeting Process is a
Substantial Benefit.
Courts have uniformly held that upholding the integrity of
the face-to-face meeting process is a substantial benefit,
warranting attorneys' fee recovery.
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Thus, in Amalgamated, 54

F.3d at 71, the Second Circuit held:

"The district court

identified the facilitation of communication among shareholders
and between shareholders and management as a substantial interest
that was vindicated by plaintiffs' action.

We agree."

Similarly, in the present action, this Court has already
noted the importance of complying with the Association's charter
documents in conducting shareholders' meetings.

In LeVanger, 3

P.3d at 190 and 191, this Court noted:
We conclude the present case raises the same concerns.
The Act's requirement that Association members act only
at a duly called meeting protects the rights of the
members and is therefore for their benefit. See id.
The Association included a similar protection in its
by-laws, which, like the Act, contemplate actions taken
only at a duly constituted meeting of Association
members. That by-law, like the Act, protects the
Association's members by requiring that member actions
be taken at member meetings where free discussion and
dissent can be heard. Absent a meeting, the
homeowners' consent must be unanimous.
C.
Enforcing Strict Compliance with Statute
is a Substantial Benefit.
The Association and its Board has always maintained that
their actions were taken in good faith and were substantially
complaint with the law.
compliance sufficient:

This Court noted that substantial
"We conclude that, because the voting

procedures protect the members' interests, they are mandatory
rather than directory and therefore strict compliance is
required.

Because the mail-in balloting procedure did not comply

strictly with either the Act or the Association's by-laws, we
conclude it was ineffectual."

Id. at 191.
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The Association apparently has not even yet understood that
admonition (strict compliance), as it maintains in its Brief that
the recent changes to the non-profit corporation act allowing for
mail-in balloting suggest their prior actions were not so bad.
The Association's open-ended mail-in balloting process to amend
the CC&R's, with fixed deadlines far beyond the pall of the
statute, with selective mailings and member contacts (and lack
thereof), with extension of the announced deadline without notice
to members, and counting votes with no consideration to who the
record shareholders were, has no relationship whatsoever to any
legitimate balloting process, even though some process of
balloting is now recognized by statute.

The Association would

also continue to ignore its own charter documents, even though
this Court went to pains to point out that both the statute then
in effect and the Association's bylaws contemplated in-person
meetings.
VI. The Association is not Entitled to the Return
of Garnished Funds.
The LeVangers fully complied with Rule 4-504 of the Utah
Rules of Judicial Administration as it relates to providing the
Association a copy of the proposed Order relating to the granting
of the LeVangers1 motion to be awarded their fees.
Association had an opportunity to object.

The

The Association was

given a copy of the proposed Order in advance of its being
submitted to the Court for signature.
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The LeVangers' counsel intended to obtain the Courtfs
signature on the Order on December 11, 2001, but discovered the
Order had already been signed when he went to the court clerk's
office in Park City.
were followed.

All of the time requirements of the rule

The trial court, on its own, and apparently

computing the deadlines independent of either of the parties,
executed the form of the Order in advance of anyone's request.
Rule 5 was fully complied with as it relates to the Writ of
Garnishment and related papers.

Rule 64D provides the notice

requirements, and the Association received actual and proper
notice of the garnishment, through the mailing made to it by the
garnishee.

There is no requirement that the Associations's

counsel also be given notice.

Rule 5 requires either that

counsel or the party to the action receive notice, which the
party did in this case.

Post-judgment matters, certainly as

regards collection, are routinely directed to the party in the
action, not party's counsel.

Each of the rules regarding

post-judgment activities allows for personal service of the party
to the action.

For example, Rule 69 regarding writs of execution

provides personal service on the judgment debtor "in the same
manner as service of a summons in a civil action."
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.

Rule 69(g),

See also, Lincoln Benefit Life

Insurance Company v. D.T. Southern Properties, 838 P.2d 672 (Utah
Crt. App. 1992) (personal service of the individual defendant in
the action, Hogle, with orders in supplemental proceedings and
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bench warrants).

In garnishment proceedings, notice is proper

when the garnishee mails the garnishment papers to the party,
which was done in this case.

It is uncontested the Association

received the garnishment papers.

It simply neglected to go to

its mailbox and get them.
Given a similar situation, the Utah Court of Appeals, in
Lincoln Benefit Life, supra, held that:
Notwithstanding the argument that Lincoln and Allstate
failed to give notice, Hogle received notice of the
default judgment on July 18, 1990, when he was
personally served with the court's order in
supplemental proceedings. This notice, which Hogle
received approximately seven weeks after the court
entered default judgment, provided him adequate
opportunity to timely move to set aside the default
j udgment.
Likewise, here, defendant had adequate opportunity to pursue
any or all of the remedies noted above upon learning the judgment
had been entered.
The notice requirement of Rule 58A with regard to the
executed Order from Court's November ruling was not followed, but
there was absolutely no detriment to the Association.

The

Association had actual knowledge of the execution of the Order no
later than December 28, 2001, according to counsel's own
admission.

The Association had the ability to pursue one or more

of the following legal remedies thereafter:

(1) request for

reconsideration of its objections or of the Court's Order; (2)
motion to stay collection activities pending appeal; or, (3)
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filing of supersedeas bond with the filing of the appeal.
Defendant elected not to pursue any of those remedies.
The trial court abused in discretion in ordering the return
of garnished funds, and its decision should be vacated.
CONCLUSION
The trial court's decision to award the LeVangers their
attorneys fees is correct and should be upheld.
The trial court abused its discretion in ordering the return
of garnished funds and should be reversed.
DATED:

January 10, 2 0 03.
ROBINSON Sc SHEEN, L.L.C.

By
E. Ja-ij^sheen
Attorneys for the LeVangers
Appellees
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ADDENDUM

Pursuant to Rule 24(a)(11) of the Utah Rules of Appellate
Procedure, no addendum to Appellee's Brief is necessary.
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